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Environmental Federalism and
State Renewable Portfolio
Standards
Brannon P. Denning†
Abstract
States have, of late, become increasingly active in environmental
regulation. Renewable energy standards, which commit utilities in
states to purchase power from renewable sources, and climate-change
mitigation requirements of various kinds, are just two recent
manifestations of state (and sometimes local) regulatory activism.
This article employs state renewable portfolio standards (RPS) as a
case study to examine how some RPS might fare if challenged under
three constitutional doctrines that restrain states—preemption, the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine (DCCD), and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV. Under current doctrine, it concludes,
the DCCD poses the greatest threat to RPS programs, as many of
those programs are currently constituted. This Article also assays
prospects for judicial alteration of that doctrine in ways that would be
favorable to state environmental innovations and suggests that the
Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v.
Corey could serve as a blueprint for designing or refining RPS that
would be resistant to constitutional challenges.
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Introduction
Though hardly quiescent in the past, states have become
increasingly active in environmental regulation. Impatient with the
perceived torpor or ideological hostility to regulation at the federal
level, and despairing of any comprehensive, supranational solution to
pressing issues like climate change, states have decided to fill the void.
Renewable energy standards, which commit utilities in states to
purchase power from renewable sources, and climate-change
mitigation requirements of various kinds, are just two recent
manifestations of state (and sometimes local) regulatory activism.
However, when states begin to regulate in ways that impact other
states (and other countries), constitutional doctrines protecting
federal interests from state action come into play. Part I of this paper
offers a primer on three constitutional doctrines that restrain states—
preemption, the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine (DCCD), and
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. Part II then uses
state renewable portfolio standards (RPS) as a case study in how
these doctrines could potentially limit state environmental initiatives.
Under current doctrine, the DCCD poses the greatest threat to RPS
programs, as many of those programs are currently constituted. But
Part II also assays prospects for judicial alteration of the doctrine in
ways that would be favorable to state environmental innovations.

I.

Federal Constitutional Restrictions on
State and Local Regulation

This section offers an overview of the three main restrictions on
state and local regulatory authority. I first discuss the ability of
Congress to preempt conflicting state and local legislation by
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exercising the affirmative authority delegated to it under Article I of
the Constitution. In addition, courts have long interpreted the
delegation of regulatory authority over interstate commerce to contain
implied restrictions on the states, prohibiting them from
discriminating against or otherwise impermissibly burdening that
commerce under the DCCD. Finally, state and local governments are
forbidden by Article IV, section 2 from treating nonresidents
differently from their own citizens under certain circumstance. Each
of these doctrines or provisions has been invoked to limit state and
local environmental regulatory schemes in the past; each has a
continued role to play in current debates over state environmental
policy, as we will see in Part II.
A.
1.

Preemption

Express Preemption

Under Article VI of the Constitution, the U.S. Constitution,
treaties made by the United States, and “the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance” of the Constitution are the
“supreme Law of the Land,” notwithstanding contrary state laws or
state constitutional provisions.1 If Congress has exercised its valid
legislative authority, conflicting state laws must give way.2 Easy cases
include those in which Congress included explicit language preempting
contrary state law.3
But Congress’s intent is not always so unequivocally stated. As
the Court has noted:
Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at
least two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where
the scheme of federal regulation is “so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it,” . . . and conflict pre-emption, where
1.

U.S. Const. art. VI; see also Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n,
505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (“Pre-emption may be either expressed or
implied, and ‘is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly
stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure
and purpose.’” (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977))).

2.

See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210 (1824)
(concluding that possession of valid federal coasting license by
steamboat operator preempted state law granting competitor a
monopoly on passage service between New York and New Jersey).

3.

See Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 132 S. Ct. 965, 970 (2012) (concluding
that the Federal Meat Inspection Act’s preemption clause “prevents a
State from imposing any additional or different—even if nonconflicting—requirements that fall within the scope of the Act and
concern a slaughterhouse’s facilities or operations”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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“compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical
impossibility,” . . . or where state law “stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.”4

The Court’s “ultimate task in any pre-emption case is to determine
whether state regulation is consistent with the structure and purpose
of the statute as a whole.”5
2.

Implied Preemption

Where Congress has not expressly preempted state legislation,
then, the Court has found an implied intent to preempt in two broad
categories of cases. Field preemption “reflects a congressional decision
to foreclose any state regulation in the area, even if it is parallel to
federal standards.”6 Conflict preemption, on the other hand, impliedly
preempts state laws that either makes compliance with state and
federal law impossible, or, if compliance with both is possible,
nevertheless presents an obstacle to one or more congressional
purposes.
a.

Field Preemption

United States v. Locke7 furnishes an example of field preemption
of a state environmental statute. Washington State had promulgated
a number of regulations relating to oil tankers. The Supreme Court
held that the inclusion of numerous provisions related to the design,
construction, repair, equipping, and crewing of tankers in the federal
Ports and Waterways Safety Act meant that “Congress has left no
room for state regulation of these matters.”8
b.

Impossibility Preemption

Though a little long in the tooth, McDermott v. Wisconsin9
provides an excellent illustration of “impossibility”-type conflict
preemption. In McDermott, compliance with federal rules regarding
4.

Gade, 505 U.S. at 98 (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. De la
Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941)).

5.

Id.

6.

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2502 (2012). See, e.g., Hines,
312 U.S. 52 (preempting state alien registration statute; rejecting
argument that requirements were parallel to and not in conflict with
federal requirements).

7.

529 U.S. 89 (2000).

8.

Id. at 111.

9.

228 U.S. 115 (1913).
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the labeling of corn syrup would have resulted in the product’s being
mislabeled and subject to seizure under state law. The Court held
that states could not pass laws that explicitly conflict with federal
requirements, leaving the subject of the regulation incapable of
complying with one regulatory regime without violating the other. In
such cases, the state must give way.10
c.

Obstacle Preemption

The other form of conflict preemption, termed “obstacle”
preemption, is more subjective than impossibility preemption. In
obstacle preemption cases, compliance with both federal and state
regulatory regimes is possible, but in some cases the state regulatory
choices are inconsistent with or harmful to broader federal policy
objectives set by Congress. For example, in Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Council,11 the Court invalidated a Massachusetts law
prohibiting the Commonwealth from contracting with companies that
did business with the government of Myanmar. Because Congress
considered and rejected much more wide-ranging penalties for
companies currently doing business in the country, choosing instead
to prohibit only new investment, the Court concluded that “the state
Burma law [was] an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s full
objectives under the federal Act.”12
Similarly, one provision of Arizona’s controversial immigration
law, which prohibited undocumented aliens from working, applying
for, or soliciting work in the state, was invalidated because it
“enact[ed] a state criminal prohibition where no federal counterpart
exists.”13 Congress, the Court held, “made a deliberate choice not to
impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in,
unauthorized employment.”14 Arizona’s law, however:
[W]ould interfere with the careful balance struck by Congress
with respect to unauthorized employment of aliens. Although
[the law] attempts to achieve one of the same goals as federal
law—the deterrence of unlawful employment—it involves a
conflict in the method of enforcement. The Court has recognized
that a “[c]onflict in technique can be fully as disruptive to the
system Congress enacted [sic] as conflict in overt policy.” . . .
The correct instruction to draw from the text, structure, and
history of [federal law] is that Congress decided it would be
inappropriate to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek or
10.

Id. at 133–34.

11.

530 U.S. 363 (2000).

12.

Id. at 373–86.

13.

Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2503 (2012).

14.

Id. at 2504.
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engage in unauthorized employment. It follows that a state law
to the contrary is an obstacle to the regulatory system Congress
chose.15

Given the enormous federal legislative and administrative footprint in
environmental regulation, any new state environmental initiatives—
especially those that are different in kind from or more stringent than
existing federal requirements—will have to contend with arguments
that they are either explicitly or impliedly preempted. Deciding
whether or not they are has become more difficult in recent years
as the Court has sent somewhat mixed signals in its implied
conflicts cases.
B.

The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
1.

The Basic Doctrine

Another important restraint on state and local laws, the DCCD
prohibits subnational governments from discriminating against or
otherwise impermissibly burdening interstate commerce. Laws that
discriminate—either on their face or in their purposes or effects—are
subject to a form of strict scrutiny requiring the state to demonstrate
that it enacted the law for a legitimate (i.e., non-protectionist)
purpose and that no less discriminatory means exist to effectuate that
purpose.16 Truly nondiscriminatory laws, however, are subject to the
more deferential Pike balancing test, whereby the law is upheld unless
the challenger proves that the “burden imposed on [interstate]
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.”17 The Supreme Court has not invalidated a law under Pike
balancing in over twenty-five years; lower courts tend to invalidate
using Pike balancing only where the putative local benefits appear to
be a pretext for discrimination or can be proven to be nil.18
15.

Id. at 2505 (quoting Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor
Coach Emps. v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 287 (1971)).

16.

See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd., v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270–71 (1984)
(invalidating law exempting locally-produced liquor and wine from 20%
excise tax; holding that the purpose of the law was to insulate locallyproduced goods from competition); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 624–28 (1978) (holding that the explicit ban on in-state disposal of
out-of-state garbage was subject to “virtually per se rule” of invalidity);
Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53 (1977)
(invalidating facially neutral law requiring all apple producers to use
FDA grade or no grade on closed containers of apples; holding that the
law discriminated in effect against out-of-state apples).

17.

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).

18.

See Brannon P. Denning, Bittker on the Regulation of
Interstate and Foreign Commerce § 6.05 6-36 (2d ed. 2013) (“If a
measure imposes significant costs, but no real benefits, or the benefits
prove to be illusory, courts will invalidate them under Pike.”).
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There is a third prong of the DCCD, but one of uncertain vitality:
the prohibition on “extraterritorial” regulation.19 Probably the most
that one can say about extraterritoriality is that it operates to
restrain a state from attempting to control activities that occur
wholly outside its jurisdiction.20
2.

Exceptions to the Doctrine

The DCCD is subject to a number of exceptions that would be
relevant to state environmental initiatives. First, the Court has held
that discrimination in favor of a public entity does not violate the
DCCD’s anti-discrimination principle if all other private entities (instate and out-of-state) are treated equally.21 Second, the Court has
held that state and local governments acting as market “participants”
as opposed to market “regulators” can escape the strictures of the
DCCD.22 Finally, because the DCCD is a default rule, Congress itself
can authorize the states to legislate in ways that would otherwise
violate the DCCD using its affirmative power to regulate interstate
commerce.23 The remainder of this section discusses each in turn.
a.

Discrimination in Favor of Public Entities

In United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority,24 the Court upheld a flow control ordinance
directing that all solid waste be processed at a single, publicly owned
facility. Though the United Haulers Court applied Pike balancing, it
held that the forced use provision of the flow control ordinance was
not “discriminatory” for DCCD purposes. The Court concluded that,
at least where the public entity was performing traditional
governmental functions, favoritism of publicly owned entities was
likely motivated for reasons other than naked protectionism and that

19.

See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 326 (1989) (involving a
Connecticut “price-affirmation statute tying Connecticut beer prices to
the prices charged in” bordering states). For doubts about its future, see
Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce
Clause: A Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 73 La. L. Rev. 979 (2013).

20.

See, e.g., Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660, 668–69 (7th
Cir. 2010) (invalidating state application of consumer credit code to outof-state car title lender); Denning, supra note 19, at 992 & n.81 (offering
other examples).

21.

See infra Part I.B.2.a.

22.

See infra Part I.B.2.b.

23.

See infra Part I.B.2.c.

24.

550 U.S. 330 (2007).
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the DCCD should not prohibit decisions by governments to
monopolize a given market.25
b.

The Market-Participant Exception

Adopted in 1976 in a case involving a state initiative to dispose of
derelict car hulks,26 the market participant doctrine is one of the bestknown exceptions to the DCCD. In short, the Court held that when
states spend taxpayer funds, they are entitled to act as private actors
do in choosing with whom to trade.27 For example, when South
Dakota built a state-owned cement plant, it was entitled to process
the orders of in-state customers before filling the orders of out-of-state
purchasers during a cement shortage.28
State and local governments may not, however, regulate beyond
the market in which they participate. Thus, in South-Central Timber
Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,29 a plurality held that Alaska’s
attempt to force purchasers of state-owned timber to process that
timber in-state prior to exportation exceeded the scope of the
exception.30 Justice White stated:
The limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it
allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the
market in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no
further. The State may not impose conditions, whether by
statute, regulation, or contract, that have a substantial
regulatory effect outside of that particular market.31

Alaska, he concluded, attached “downstream” restrictions on the
processing of the timber after the sale had been completed. Alaska
was not a participant in the timber processing market, but was trying
25.

Id. at 342–44; see also Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2008)
(applying United Haulers to state law exempting from income tax
income derived from bonds issued by the taxing state or its subdivisions,
but taxing income from all other bonds). For a critique of the public
entities exception, see Norman R. Williams & Brannon P. Denning, The
“New Protectionism” and the American Common Market, 85 Notre
Dame L. Rev. 247 (2009). The exception appears to apply only to the
anti-discrimination principle; in both cases the Court applied Pike
balancing. See Davis, 553 U.S. at 353–54; United Haulers, 550 U.S. at
346–47; but see Davis, 553 U.S. at 354–56 (questioning whether the
Court should apply balancing).

26.

Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).

27.

See id. at 809–10.

28.

Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).

29.

467 U.S. 82 (1984).

30.

Id. at 98.

31.

Id. at 97.
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to regulate that market.32 In addition, the Court subsequently held
that states may not attempt to “participate” in a market by the
discriminatory granting or withholding of tax credits; taxation, the
Court felt, was a “primeval governmental activity” in which the
average private actor could not participate.33
c.

Congressional Redelegation

The DCCD is a default rule, defeasible by congressional exercise
of its affirmative power over interstate commerce. If Congress chooses,
it may pass legislation disabling the DCCD, but it must “expressly
state[]” its intent to do so.34 In 1945, for example, Congress passed the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, which left the regulation of the “business of
insurance” to the states.35 The Court upheld the Act in Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Benjamin,36 authorizing South Carolina’s imposition
of a three percent premium tax on foreign, but not domestic,
insurance companies.37
C.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV

Article IV, section 2 entitles “[t]he Citizens of each State” to “all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”38 Derived
from a similar provision in the Articles of Confederation, the
Privileges and Immunities Clause prescribes a rule of substantial
equality for nonresidents when certain “fundamental rights” are at

32.

Id. at 98–99.

33.

New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988). Though the
Court has never expressly so held, it has assumed in several cases that
discriminatory cash subsidies do not violate the DCCD. See, e.g., Id. at
278 (stating that “[d]irect subsidization of domestic industry does not
ordinarily run afoul of” the antidiscrimination principle); see also West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994). For a
defense of the differential treatment despite the fact that the economic
effects of subsidies versus tax credits are identical, see Dan T. Coenen,
Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 Yale L.J.
965 (1998); but see Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits”
Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112 Harv. L. Rev.
379 (1998) (taking the view they ought to be treated equally for
constitutional purposes).

34.

South-Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 91–92.

35.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006).

36.

328 U.S. 408 (1946).

37.

Id. at 434–36. For the view that Congress does not have this power, see
Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not “Overrule” the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 153 (2005).

38.

U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2.

1527

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·2014
Environmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio Standards

issue.39 For our purposes, the right to pursue a common calling or
conduct a lawful trade on terms of substantial equality with residents
and the right not to be taxed more heavily than residents are within
the universe of fundamental rights recognized by the Court.40 To
defend a discriminatory law against a Privileges and Immunities
challenge, the state needs to “demonstrat[e] that ‘(i) there is a
substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the
discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial
relationship to the State’s objective.’”41 In determining the substantial
relationship, courts will usually consider the availability of less
discriminatory means.42
Despite the substantial overlap between the Privileges and
Immunities Clause and the DCCD, significant differences exist that
limit the utility of the Clause as an all-purpose tool to combat
discrimination.43 Most importantly, only natural persons can invoke
the protections of the Clause; corporations are not “citizens” under
Article IV, section 2.44 Moreover, the Court has refused to recognize a
market participant exception to the Privileges and Immunities

39.

See generally Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 384, 388–93 (2003) (discussing judicial
interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause from 1823 to
modern times). That the Clause only guarantees equal treatment with
regard to “fundamental rights” was first announced in Baldwin v. Fish
& Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978), in which the Court refused
to apply the Clause to elk hunting licenses, which were cheaper for
residents than for nonresidents.

40.

See, e.g., Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 315
(1998) (holding that the Privileges and Immunities Clause guarantees
the right not to be taxed more heavily as nonresident); United Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221–22
(1984) (holding that the Clause protects the right of nonresidents to ply
a trade on terms of substantial equality with residents). The Clause
applies to municipalities as well as states. United Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 215–17.

41.

Lunding, 522 U.S. at 298 (citing Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470
U.S. 274, 284 (1985)).

42.

Piper, 470 U.S. at 284 & n.17 (“In deciding whether the discrimination
bears a close or substantial relationship to the State’s objective, the
Court has considered the availability of less restrictive means.”).

43.

See generally Denning, supra note 39, at 393–404 (detailing the
differences between the scope of the Clause and that of the DCCD).

44.

Id. at 394–96.
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Clause.45 Further, as a textual restriction on the states, Congress
cannot override the Clause as it can the DCCD.46
***

In the next Part, I will examine an increasingly popular state
initiative to curb climate change in light of these constitutional
restrictions. As many are currently designed, RPS programs are
vulnerable to invalidation either through preemption (should the
federal government ever enact a national RPS) or under the DCCD.
As for the latter, however, I will discuss the possibility that changes
in that doctrine may render it less hostile even to discriminatory
RPS programs.

II. Renewable Portfolio Standards:
A Case Study in Environmental Federalism
States have undertaken a number of environmental initiatives
ranging from suing the EPA over its alleged failure to regulate carbon
dioxide as a pollutant,47 to initiating cap-and-trade plans to restrict
carbon emissions,48 to creating elaborate renewable portfolio standards
(RPS) that require power generators to purchase power from
renewable resources. All of these recent initiatives raise many of the
constitutional issues discussed above. In this section, however, I want
to use RPS as a case study in the vulnerability of some state
environmental initiatives to constitutional federalism restrictions.
RPS programs make particularly good vehicles for close
examination of these issues for several reasons. First, they are
widespread; thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have
enacted them.49 Moreover, the states are—so far—writing on a blank
slate. Congress has not enacted a federal RPS, though several have
45.

United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 465 U.S. at 219–20; Denning,
supra note 39, at 396–97.

46.

Denning, supra note 39, at 397–99; but see Gillian E. Metzger, Congress,
Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1468, 1492–93
(2007) (arguing that Congress should have power to waive the Privileges
and Immunities Clause’s protections as well).

47.

See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 515–26 (2007)
(concluding that Massachusetts had standing to sue the EPA under the
Clean Air Act).

48.

Clean Air Mkts. Grp. v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2003)
(concluding that New York State cap-and-trade program was preempted
by the federal Clean Air Act).

49.

See Rules, Regulations & Policies for Renewable Energy, Database of
St. Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, http://www.dsireusa.
org/summarytables/rrpre.cfm (last visited Mar. 5, 2014); see also infra note
53 and accompanying text.
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been proposed. Further, many state RPS are drafted in ways that put
them squarely in the crosshairs of, for example, the DCCD. But the
vulnerability of RPS programs to challenge under the DCCD
also provide an opportunity to explore the availability of various
exceptions to the DCCD, as well as to discuss whether recent DCCD
cases suggest an openness on the Court’s part to environmental
innovations that might have been regarded as suspect a
generation ago.
A.

An RPS Primer

RPS programs “require electric utilities and other retail electric
providers to include a specified percentage of electricity supply from
renewable energy sources.”50 These obligations can be satisfied “by
owning renewable energy facilities and producing their own renewable
power or by purchasing such power from others’ facilities.”51 In the
latter cases, utilities can satisfy their RPS requirements by purchasing
Renewable Energy Credits (RECs) from qualifying generators. Those
owning renewable power generation facilities in turn receive RECs—
usually one REC for each kilowatt hour (kWh) of renewable energy
generated—and may sell these to other utilities who need to meet the
RPS requirements.52
As of 2012, “[t]wenty-nine states and the District of Columbia
have some form of RPS,”53 which has now been expanded to thirtyeight states.54 The popularity of RPS is due in part to the fact that
“they provide various benefits including economic development,
reduced emissions, increased job opportunities, establishment of more
reliable energy supplies, and greater fuel diversification.”55 Not
50.

Steven Ferrey, Threading the Constitutional Needle with Care: The
Commerce Clause Threat to the New Infrastructure of Renewable
Power, 7 Tex. J. Oil Gas & Energy L. 59, 61–62 (2012); see also
Nathan E. Endrud, Note, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their
Continued Validity and Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, the Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legislation, 45
Harv. J. on Legis. 259, 261 (2008) (“Renewable portfolio standards
are obligations on retail sellers of electricity to include in their
generation ‘portfolios’ a certain amount of electricity from ‘renewable’
energy sources.”).

51.

Endrud, supra note 50, at 261 (citing Nancy Rader & Scott
Hempling, The Renewables Portfolio Standard—A Practical
Guide 2 (2001), available at http://www.naruc.org/grants/Documents/
rps.pdf).

52.

But see infra notes 69–70 and accompanying
“multipliers” awarded to certain activities).

53.

Ferrey, supra note 50, at 62.

54.

Rules, Regulations & Policies for Renewable Energy, supra note 49,

55.

Id. at 65 (citing K.S. Cory & B.G. Swezey, Renewable Portfolio
Standards in the States: Balancing Goals and Implementation
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surprisingly, then, states have tried to retain as many of those
benefits as possible for their own citizens and “to prevent the
‘leakage’ of” those benefits to other states.56 As one commentator
notes, “[m]ost of these strategies involve limitations on which
renewable energy sources are eligible to satisfy the states’
RPS obligations.”57
B.

State Parochialism in RPS Programs

State RPS programs vary in their particulars and implementation.
I am less interested here in describing those programs in all of their
complexity, than in highlighting features common to many initiatives
that could be described as parochial or protectionist, thus making
them particularly vulnerable to constitutional challenge. These
features include (1) in-state and in-region restrictions on generation,
purchase, or sale of power or requirements that RECs come from
particular states or regions; (2) special multipliers altering the REC to
KwH ratio for certain generators; and (3) tax-subsidy schemes
benefiting in-state renewable energy construction projects.
1.

In-State and In-Region Restrictions

These restrictions “limit the eligibility of qualifying renewable
energy to that which is generated within the state or within the
surrounding region . . . .”58 North Carolina’s RPS program, for
example, caps the amount of energy purchased out-of-state at twentyfive percent.59 California, Colorado, and Ohio contain similar
preferences for in-state generated energy.60 Likewise, “[i]n-state
consumption, metering, and sales requirements limit the eligibility of
renewable energy to that which . . . is either physically consumed, or
quantitatively verified (metered) within the state, or sold into the
state.”61 Several states restrict the eligibility of RECs to energy
generated either within the state or within the region.62 Iowa,
Minnesota, and Hawaii prohibit the exportation of RECs.63 In
addition, “[r]egional delivery requirements [mandate] that qualifying
Strategies 7 (2007), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy08osti/
41409.pdf).
56.

Endrud, supra note 50, at 264.

57.

Id.

58.

Id. (citations omitted).

59.

Ferrey, supra note 50, at 76 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133.8(b)(2)(e)
(2009)).

60.

Id. at 75.

61.

Endrud, supra note 50, at 264 (citations omitted).

62.

Ferrey, supra note 50, at 76–78.

63.

Id. at 86 n.229.
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renewable energy be delivered into the regional power pool or
independent system operator . . . control area serving the state.”64
Finally, “[i]n-state benefits requirements require that qualifying
renewable energy provide sufficient specific (named) or generic
(unnamed) benefits to the state.”65
Few of these provisions have generated reported cases. However,
when Massachusetts passed a statute to stimulate development of
renewable energy plants in 2008, one provision required companies
that distributed electricity in the state to sign long-term contracts
with renewable power companies that were located in Massachusetts.66
A Canadian company filed a DCCD challenge to that provision, as
well as another provision requiring the state Department of Energy
Resources “to establish a requirement that a minimum percentage of
electricity sales be from ‘new on-site renewable energy generating
sources’ located in” state.67 The suit was later settled when
Massachusetts agreed to grandfather in some existing contracts to
supply electricity into which TransCanada had entered.68 Broader
questions about the constitutionality of the law’s provisions, however,
were not addressed.
2.

REC Multipliers for In-State Activities

Over half the states with RPS programs provide preferential
treatment for in-state or in-region generation for renewable power,
usually through a “multiplier” that increases the ratio of RECs to
kWh generated from 1:1 to 1+x:1.69 Arizona, Delaware, Michigan, and

64.

Endrud, supra note 50, at 264.

65.

Id. at 264–65.

66.

See Richard Lehfeldt, Woody N. Peterson & David T. Schur, Commerce
Clause Conflict: In-state Green Mandates Face Constitutional
Challenge, Pub. Utils. Fortnightly, Dec. 2010, at 38, 39; see also
Carolyn Elefant & Edward A. Holt, The Commerce Clause
and Implications for State Renewable Portfolio Standard
Programs: Clean Energy States Alliance State RPS Policy
Report 19 (2011).

67.

Elefant & Holt, supra note 66, at 21 (quoting Green Communities
Act, ch. 169, sec. 32, § 11F(g), 2008 Mass. Acts 308, 334); see also Erin
Ailworth, State Looking to Settle Suit Over Law on Clean Energy,
Boston Globe, May 27, 2010, at B9, B11 (describing the suit and the
state’s efforts to settle it).

68.

See Erin Ailworth, Deal Reached in State Energy Suit, Boston Globe,
May 29, 2010, at B5, B6.

69.

Ferrey, supra note 50, at 72–78.
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Montana also offer various incentives for using in-state components
and labor in the construction of power generators.70
3.

SBC and Subsidy Programs

As one author observes, “an alternative strategy to energy
eligibility restrictions is to lower the costs of in-state renewable power
generation through subsidies, which can be financed by system
benefits charges on the energy sector at large or by general tax
revenues.”71 Some states with RPS programs impose system-wide, perkWh charges (SBCs) on utility customers, the revenue from which is
then placed in a segregated fund from which renewable power projects
are subsidized.72 In some cases, the subsidies are available only for instate projects.73 California subsidizes the generation of renewable
power and forbids its export to the grid.74
C.

The Constitutionality of RPS Programs

The biggest potential threat to state RPS programs—although
that threat has not yet materialized—would come in the form of a
federal mandate.75 Unless well-drawn savings clauses were included,
congressional legislation could expose the patchwork quilt of statelevel RPS to preemption challenges.76 This has already happened in
70.

Id. at 78–79 (noting that these states have “preferences or multipliers
for RECs created at power generation units that employ an in-state
workforce or in-state manufacture components”).

71.

Endrud, supra note 50, at 265.

72.

See Ferrey, supra note 50, at 70 (“Approximately one-third of U.S.
states have enacted SBC and ‘public benefit funds,’ as a direct subsidy
mechanism to support the development of renewable energy resources.”
(citing Elizabeth Doris et al., State of the States 2009:
Renewable Energy Development and the Role of Policy 65–66
(2009), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/46667.pdf)).

73.

See id. at 80–84 (listing Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania
as examples, either by statute or by almost exclusively spending funds
on in-state programs).

74.

Id. at 84–85.

75.

See Endrud, supra note 50, at 280 (“[A] federal RPS program could
create a different kind of constitutional barrier to state RPS programs,
one which could result in the invalidation of such programs altogether:
federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause.”).

76.

Id. at 281. The flipside is that Congress might immunize protectionist
RPS programs from DCCD scrutiny, as it may do by legislating under
its affirmative power to regulate interstate commerce. See supra Part
I.A. One commentator has explicitly recommended that Congress do
just this, arguing that “the overall utility of such restrictions in
providing incentives for states to overcome public choice problems and
enact aggressive standards may outweigh the resulting burdens on
interstate commerce.” Endrud, supra note 50, at 285.
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cases involving mitigation of cross-border air pollution and other state
air quality initiatives.77 Even if some portion of state RPS
requirements were included within the scope of one or more savings
clauses, the Court will nevertheless apply implied preemption
principles (conflict, obstacle, and field preemption) to that portion of
the legislation not within the savings clause.78 While states could
formerly claim a “presumption against preemption” to prevent the
application of such principles, considerable question surrounds how
much of that presumption remains. While federal RPS legislation has
been introduced, however, none has become law.79
Of the remaining restrictions, then, the DCCD presents the most
obvious vehicle by which regulated entities could challenge state RPS
requirements—especially those that seem to favor in-state over out-ofstate activities. As noted above, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, while overlapping with the DCCD to a great extent, does not
apply other than to natural persons, rendering it unlikely to play a
large role in this context.80
The Supreme Court has, in the past, invalidated quite a number
of state laws alleged to advance some environmental goal. As

77.

See, e.g., Clean Air Mkts. Grp. v. Pataki, 338 F.3d 82, 89 (2d Cir. 2003)
(concluding that New York State cap-and-trade program was preempted
by the federal Clean Air Act).

78.

See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869 (2000)
(“[T]he savings clause . . . does not bar the ordinary working of conflict
pre-emption principles.”); see also Scott Gallisdorfer, Note, Clean Air
Act Preemption of State Common Law: Greenhouse Gas Nuisance
Claims After AEP v. Connecticut, 99 Va. L. Rev. 131, 141–42 (2013)
(“Although the Supreme Court has generally interpreted savings clauses
to preclude any finding of express preemption, it has ‘decline[d] to give
broad effect to saving clauses where doing so would upset the careful
regulatory scheme established by federal law.’ Thus, savings clauses do
not usually prevent the operation of ordinary implied preemption
principles, and they may even create a negative inference ‘that
everything else not preserved by [the savings clause] is preempted.’”)
(footnotes omitted) (alteration in original).

79.

See Trevor D. Stiles, Renewable Resources and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 4 Envtl. & Energy L. & Pol’y J. 34, 50–51 (2009)
(discussing proposals for federal RPS).

80.

Which is not to say that it hasn’t previously played a role in
environmental or conservation contexts. For example, conservation was
cited as a reason in Baldwin to charge out-of-state hunters more for elk
hunting licenses. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371
(1978). Similarly, in Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), South
Carolina cited conservation of native shrimp stocks as a reason to
charge out-of-state shrimpers 100 times more for a shrimping license
than Palmetto State shrimpers. Id. at 389. The Court rejected this,
however, finding in-state shrimpers just as likely to pose a threat as
those from out-of-state. Id. at 398–99.
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Professor Ferrey has noted, “[g]ood environmental motives do not
matter or change the constitutional analysis.”81 The Court has, for
example, invalidated a number of state efforts to prohibit or
discourage the importation of out-of-state solid waste.82 It has also
invalidated attempts to require the use of a privately owned in-state
facility, prohibiting the disposal of waste at other, possibly cheaper,
out-of-state disposal sites.83 The Court has also held unconstitutional
state efforts to conserve valuable resources by, for example,
prohibiting the exportation of minnows,84 restricting nonresident
fishing,85 and barring the export of water.86
In a case with obvious implications for the fate of discriminatory
RPS programs, the Court struck down, on DCCD grounds, an
Oklahoma law requiring coal-fired plants located in the state to favor
local industry by requiring it to burn at least ten percent Oklahomamined coal.87 The outcome of Wyoming v. Oklahoma is of a piece with
numerous earlier cases rejecting state defenses that discriminatory
laws were motivated not by a desire to harm out-of-state actors, but
rather to benefit in-state industries.88 A common feature of these laws
is that they facially discriminated against out-of-state products or

81.

Ferrey, supra note 50, at 98.

82.

See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93
(1994) (invalidating a discriminatory per ton waste disposal fee); Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S.
353 (1992) (invalidating a state law permitting counties to prohibit outof-county waste); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334
(1992) (invalidating a disposal fee on out-of-state hazardous waste
shipped into the state); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978) (invalidating a ban on importation of out-of-state solid waste).

83.

See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383
(1994). But see United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (refusing to extend C & A Carbone
to an ordinance requiring disposal at a publicly owned processing
facility); see also infra Section II.D.3 (discussing possible implications of
United Haulers for RPS programs).

84.

Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).

85.

Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) (striking down
Virginia restriction on nonresident fishing in Chesapeake Bay).

86.

Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).

87.

Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992).

88.

See, e.g., Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (rejecting
Hawaii exemption of locally-produced wine and liquor from excise tax);
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (invalidating
statute forbidding export of shrimp before heads and tails removed
locally); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (striking
down state statute requiring in-state natural gas customers be preferred
over those from out-of-state).
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economic actors, could not take advantage of one of the DCCD’s
exceptions, and could not satisfy the DCCD’s heightened scrutiny
applicable to discriminatory law.
It appears that a substantial number of state RPS provisions are
discriminatory, either because they have preferences for power
generated in state, or limit the amount of out-of-state RECs that can
be used to satisfy the required renewable percentage.89 Even “in-region
location requirements, while not discriminatory towards certain
neighboring states, would still be facially discriminatory against the
remainder of states . . . .”90 To the extent they are related to the
geographic origins of the renewable power generated, multipliers, too,
could be seen as discriminatory. Could these programs nevertheless
pass muster under either an exception to the DCCD or because there
are no less discriminatory means to meet the goals of RPS program?
I begin with the exceptions to the DCCD. Because Congress has
not explicitly authorized discriminatory aspects of these programs,91
states would either have to fit their programs under the newly minted
“public entity” or the older market participant exception. Either
would be a difficult fit unless each is expanded by the Court. Putting
aside the question whether climate change mitigation is a “traditional
governmental function,” the public entities exception would not apply
unless the utilities from which consumers obtained their power were
(to some uncertain extent) government-owned. As described in the
literature, it does not seem as if state governments have monopolized
the renewable energy market and forced all consumers to buy from
state-owned generators, regardless whether customers would prefer to
purchase power elsewhere.
Because RPS are mandates to private utilities to meet certain
renewable energy targets prescribed by the states, moreover, it would
be difficult for states to claim that they were merely participating in
the energy market.92 These prescriptions apply to the supply of energy
to all the utilities’ customers, not just to the state as a customer.
Could the laws escape invalidation because there are no less
discriminatory means available to effectuate the goal of these RPS

89.

See Ferrey, supra note 50, at 72–85, 106 (concluding that “[m]any
states” facially discriminate).

90.

Endrud, supra note 50, at 271 (citing Nancy Rader & Scott
Hempling, The Renewables Portfolio Standard: A Practical
Guide A-1 (2001), available at energy.gov/sites/prod/files/oeprod/
DocumentsandMedia/narucrps.pdf).

91.

See supra Section I.B.2.c; see also Endrud, supra note 50, at 285
(arguing that Congress should consider doing so).

92.

Ferrey, supra note 50, at 103–05 (agreeing that because RPS programs
are regulatory in nature, the market participant exception likely is not
available).

1536

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·2014
Environmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio Standards

programs—viz., to reduce harmful emissions and foster the creation of
viable alternative energy sources? Assuming that the latter would
constitute a legitimate (i.e., non-protectionist) end, the answer to the
question largely turns on what is meant by “less discriminatory
means”? Does the requirement mean states are obligated to use the
least discriminatory means possible? Or must it at least show that a
good reason—unrelated to economic protectionism—exists for taking
account of the regulated subject’s geographic origin?
In Maine v. Taylor,93 the Court upheld a ban on the importation
of baitfish into Maine, because of fears that parasites from non-native
species could endanger the native fish population.94 The Court
accepted the trial court’s finding that no test was available to screen
the imported fish at the border and further held that the State was
not obligated to create one before interfering with trade.95 Elsewhere I
have argued that the outcome in Taylor suggests that when there’s no
taint of protectionism in its end, the state should receive some leeway
in the means it employs and that “less discriminatory” should not
ipso facto be read to require that the state employ the least
discriminatory means.96
The problem for many state RPS programs, however, is that they
appear specifically designed to secure economic benefits for the state,
or at least prevent or minimize the export of those benefits to other
states.97 Several states specifically instruct implementing agencies to
maximize the in-state benefits when writing regulations or drafting
policies to operationalize the programs.98 Under current doctrine—an
important qualification to which I’ll return—courts are likely to look
skeptically on such explicitly discriminatory programs.
However, programs that combine nondiscriminatory taxes with
subsidies to in-state renewable energy projects99 could fare much
better, despite the Court’s holding in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v.
Healy.100 West Lynn Creamery invalidated a tax-subsidy program
designed to benefit Massachusetts dairy farmers. A nondiscriminatory
tax was levied on the sale of milk, much of which came from out of
93.

477 U.S. 131 (1986).

94.

Id. at 137–52.

95.

Id. at 146–47.

96.

Brannon P. Denning, One Toke Over the (State) Line: Constitutional
Limits on “Pot Tourism” Restrictions, 66 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2277078 (last revised Dec. 18, 2013).

97.

See supra Section II.B.

98.

See supra Section II.B.1.

99.

See supra Section II.B.3.

100. 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
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state, by milk dealers. The revenue was placed in a special fund and
used to dole out subsidies to the Massachusetts farmers.101 While
acknowledging that each component of the scheme was
constitutionally permissible, the combination, the Court held, could
not withstand scrutiny. As it operated, only out-of-state milk
producers ended up paying taxes; in fact, in-state farmers often
received much more than the value of the tax imposed.102 This was
too much for even a staunch DCCD critic like Justice Scalia, who
concurred in the Court’s decision.103
Important differences exist between Massachusetts’s program and
some SBC/subsidy plans that have been put in place. The fatal flaw
in Massachusetts’s plan was that in actual operation, the
nondiscriminatory nature was illusory because of the offsetting
subsidies. As a result of the latter, only out-of-state milk producers
paid the tax.104 By imposing a system charge on all power consumers,
you reduce the chances that only out-of-state interests will pay the
SBCs because in staters subject to the charge will be made whole (or
more) by receiving subsidies. The identity of the groups subject to the
tax and then eligible for subsidies will likely not, as it did in West
Lynn Creamery, divide along in-state/out-of-state lines.
D.

The Future of the DCCD

The analysis above assumes no change in current doctrine.
However, the current Court has signaled some interest in restricting
the scope of the DCCD in ways that could aid RPS programs’
defenses against constitutional challenges. First, the Court could
expand a prior holding requiring that plaintiffs prove they were
“similarly situated” to the in-state beneficiary of an allegedly
discriminatory law or regulation. Second, recent cases demonstrate a
willingness to expand the market participant doctrine or create entire
new exceptions to the DCCD. Finally, the Court might simply restrict
the DCCD by requiring that discriminatory or protectionist intent be
proven to prevail.
1.

“Similarly Situated”

In General Motors Corp. v. Tracy,105 the Court upheld a state
exemption from sales and use taxes for certain in-state sales of natural
101. Id. at 190–91.
102. Id. at 194.
103. Id. at 207–12 (Scalia, J., concurring).
104. The Court stressed this element in a subsequent case. Pharm. Research
& Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 670 (2003) (“[T]he order
effectively imposed a tax on out-of-state producers to subsidize
production by their in-state competitors.”).
105. 519 U.S. 278 (1997).
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gas. Ohio imposed a use tax on property purchased outside the state
and brought into the state for use. It exempted natural gas purchased
from a “natural gas company,” defined as anyone “engaged in the
business of supplying natural gas for lighting, power, or heating
purposes to consumers within the state,” and further construed by the
Ohio Supreme Court to be limited to public utilities.106 GM sued,
alleging that the exemption discriminated against out-of-state natural
gas—it purchased gas for operating its plants from out-of-state
independent gas sellers and had to pay a use tax on the natural gas.107
The Court, however, rejected the claim, holding that “the market
for exempt natural gas purchases from local public utilities was
discrete from the market for taxable natural gas purchases from
interstate gas marketers.”108 In other words, the Court concluded,
because the in-state and out-of-state natural gas in the case were not
similarly situated “there can be no local preference, whether by
express discrimination against interstate commerce or undue burden
upon it, to which the dormant Commerce Clause may apply.”109
Were states to abandon the geographic limitations in favor of
specifying, for example, the types of renewable energy that will satisfy
the RPS program requirements, as many commentators have advised
doing, a DCCD challenge might be harder to maintain even if the
eligible renewable energy correlates with a particular state or region.
If states can explain that different types of energy or even different
types of renewable energy represent discrete markets, as in Tracy,
then they might avoid invalidation. Even regulations regulating
transmission distance might be defensible, despite having a geographic
component, if regulators can demonstrate why it compromises the
programs’ goals to import energy from far away as opposed to
requiring it to be transmitted closer to home.
2.

Expand Existing Exceptions or Create New Ones

With the “public entities” exception, the Roberts Court showed
itself willing to limit the DCCD by simply carving out an exception to
the anti-discrimination principle. The flow control ordinance in United
Haulers110 was clearly market regulation, not market participation—
private actors usually lack the legal authority to force customers to
106. Id. at 281–82 (citing Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5727.01(D)(4) (1996);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5727.01(E)(4) (Supp. 1990); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 5727.01(E)(8) (1986); Chrysler Corp. v. Tracy, 652
N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 1995)).
107. Id. at 285–86.
108. Walter Hellerstein et al., State and Local Taxation: Cases
and Materials 151 (9th ed. 2009).
109. Tracy, 519 U.S. at 300.
110. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
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buy goods or services from it. However, as Norman Williams and I
have observed elsewhere, the exemption is undertheorized and its
scope uncertain.111 For example, it is not at all clear how much
involvement by the state is needed to convert something into a
“public entity.”112 Perhaps states could argue that because the state
has chosen to monopolize the provision of power—even where it
delegates that power to a private entity—it can dictate the terms on
which that entity purchases power. States would likely have little
trouble selling the claim that the provision of electricity is a
“traditional governmental function.”
On the other hand, it might be that the Court expands the
market participant doctrine to encompass at least some aspects of
RPS programs. Just last term the Court rejected a DCCD challenge
to Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act, which permitted queries
only by state citizens.113 While most of the opinion addressed the
challengers’ Privileges and Immunities Clause claim, the Court briefly
addressed the DCCD at the end. In his opinion, Justice Alito
suggested the Act could be defended under the market participant
exception because the market for publicly available state information
“is a market for a product that the Commonwealth has created and of
which the Commonwealth is the sole manufacturer.”114
Similarly, it might be said that the state is the sole creator of
RECs and that the market for them would not exist but for the
state’s involvement; therefore, the state is entitled to offer whatever
ratio of credits to kWhs it deems appropriate, and restrict the transfer
of those RECs however it wishes. Or it might agree that because
there is no economic difference between a cash subsidy and a tax
exemption or credit, states can “participate” in the market for
renewable energy through the use of its tax code to stimulate
construction of renewable energy projects.115
3.

Further Restrict Scope of the DCCD

Just as United Haulers simply created a categorical exception
from the DCCD’s antidiscrimination principle for discrimination in
favor of public entities, the Court might be inclined to further roll
back the coverage of the DCCD in cases involving RPS programs. In
111. Williams & Denning, supra note 25, at 262–79.
112. Id. at 282–92.
113. McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1713 (2013).
114. Id.
115. Cf. Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 343–48 (2008) (plurality
op.) (Souter, J.) (arguing that Kentucky’s discriminatory taxation of
income produced by out-of-state municipal bonds could be defended
under the market participant doctrine). But see Williams & Denning,
supra note 255, at 296–304 (criticizing such an expansion).
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McBurney, for example, Justice Alito questioned the DCCD’s
applicability. “Virginia’s FOIA law neither ‘regulates’ nor ‘burdens’
interstate commerce,” he wrote, “rather, it merely provides a service
to local citizens that would not otherwise be available at all.”116 At
other points in the opinion, he stressed the lack of discriminatory or
protectionist intent behind Virginia’s law.117
Justice Alito’s discussion echoed Chief Justice Roberts’
justification for the newly minted exception created in United
Haulers, in which he referred to reasons other than simple economic
protectionism for favoring public entities over in-state and out-ofstate private entities. This might suggest that the Court is poised to
require proof of discriminatory or protectionist intent for state laws
challenged under the DCCD.118 If so, that would mark a departure
from current doctrine, and would likely make DCCD claims more
difficult to win.119 But criticism of the DCCD on the Court has
intensified;120 the Court has invalidated only one law under the DCCD
in the last decade.121 It is not out of the realm of possibility that the
Court would radically alter doctrine, especially if it has a sense that,
relative to forty or fifty years ago when the contemporary DCCD
began to really take shape, state laws are much less nakedly
protectionist today.122
116. McBurney, 133 S. Ct. at 1720.
117. See id. at 1715–19 (finding the petitioner “offered no proof—that the
challenged provision . . . was enacted in order to provide a competitive
economic advantage for Virginia citizens”).
118. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–45 (1976) (requiring proof
of discriminatory intent to sustain a race discrimination claim under the
Equal Protection Clause, and holding that disparate impact alone is not
sufficient).
119. Scholars have criticized Davis on similar grounds. See, e.g., Laurence
H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16–20, at 1511–14 (2d
ed. 1988); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317
(1987); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41
Stan. L. Rev. 1105 (1989); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent
and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 935 (1989).
120. Only Justices Kennedy and Alito dissented in United Haulers and Davis.
Davis, 553 U.S. at 362–76 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); United Haulers
Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 356–
71 (2007) (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens dissented in the latter,
but not the former. United Haulers, 550 U.S. at 356–71 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
121. See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (invalidating New York law
permitting mail-order direct shipment of in-state, but not out-of-state
wines).
122. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 145, 145–46 (arguing that changes in constitutional

1541

Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64· Issue 4·2014
Environmental Federalism and State Renewable Portfolio Standards
E.

Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey:123 A Harbinger?

The recent Rocky Mountain Farmers Union case, in which parties
challenged various provisions of California’s new low carbon fuel
standards suggests that even without wholesale changes to the
DCCD, courts may grant states considerable leeway in crafting their
RPS programs, at least where the programs are untainted by
economic protectionism.124 In seeking to reduce state greenhouse gas
emissions, California crafted fuel standards that employed “‘a lifecycle
analysis’ to determine the total carbon intensity of a given
transportation fuel.”125 Instead of simply focusing on the emissions
from tailpipes in the state, California chose “to account for emissions
associated with all aspects of the production, refining, and
transportation of a fuel, with the aim of reducing total, well-to-wheel
[greenhouse gas] emissions.”126
In order to compare the emissions of fuels created from a diverse
group of “feedstocks,” California created tables of fuels that
“incorporate[d] comprehensive data on the lifecycle emissions of
various fuels.”127 These tables included data on the emissions from
production and transportation of the fuels before they entered the
tanks of California vehicles.128 The schedules issued by the state
included “default pathways” comprised of “average values” of the
carbon intensity of a fuel.129 In addition, regulated parties were
entitled “to register individualized pathways” that either “rel[y] in
part on a default pathway but proposes a replacement for one or more
of the pathway’s average values” or “a new, individualized pathway”
for the fuel.130
According to the court, “[e]thanol production is a resourceintensive process, requiring electricity and steam. . . . The choices of
type of feedstock, source of electricity, and source of thermal energy
affect the carbon intensity of the fuel pathway.”131

doctrine are caused by “shifts” in Justices’ “tacit factual assumptions
underlying legal doctrine”).
123. 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014).
124. Id. at 1077.
125. Id. at 1080.
126. Id. at 1081 (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95481(a)(38) (2007)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1082.
129. Id.
130. Id. (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95486(c),(d) (2007)).
131. Id. (citing Changes to Renewable Fuel Standard Program, 75 Fed. Reg.
14,745 (Mar. 26, 2010)).
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To determine the total carbon intensity values for each ethanol
pathway, the [state] model considers the carbon intensity of
factors including: (1) growth and transportation of the
feedstock, with a credit for the GHGs absorbed during
photosynthesis; (2) efficiency of production; (3) type of
electricity used to power the plant; (4) fuel used for thermal
energy; (5) milling process used; (6) offsetting value of an
animal-feed co-product called distillers’ grains, that displaces
demand for feed that would generate its own emissions in
production; (7) transportation of the fuel to the blender in
California; and (8) conversion of land to agricultural use.132

These factors were then “separate[d] . . . into those that are correlated
with location and those that are not, using a regional identifier as a
shorthand for the factors correlated with location.”133 While
“[e]missions from transporting the feedstock and the refined fuel are
related to location,” the court noted, “they are not directly
proportionate to distance traveled.”134 The court further explained
that “[t]ransportation emissions reflect a combination of: (1) distance
traveled, including distance traveled inside California to the fuel
blender; (2) total mass and volume transported; and (3) efficiency of
the method of transport.”135 This combination can produce some
apparently anomalies. “California ethanol produces the most
transportation emissions because California grows no corn for ethanol,
so its producers import raw corn, which is bulkier and heavier than
the refined ethanol shipped by producers in Brazil and the
Midwest.”136 Brazilian ethanol, which comes by ship, produces few
transportation emissions relative to the distance traveled because of
the efficiency of shipping.137 A number of ethanol producers obtained
individualized pathways as well.138
As for crude oil, to which the state also assigned values, it
“presents different climate challenges from ethanol and other

132. Id. at 1083.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Cal. Envtl. Prot. Agency Air Res. Bd., Detailed
California-Modified
GREET
Pathways
for
Brazilian
Sugarcane Ethanol: Average Brazilian Ethanol, With
Mechanized Harvesting and Electricity Co-product Credit,
With Electricity Co-product Credit (Sept. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/092309lcfs_cane_etoh.pdf).
138. Id. at 1084.
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biofuels.”139 As the court noted, “[c]orn and sugarcane absorb carbon
dioxide as they grow, offsetting emissions released when ethanol is
burned. By contrast, the carbon in crude oil makes a one-way trip
from the Earth’s crust to the atmosphere.”140
For crude oil and its derivatives, emissions from combustion are
largely fixed, but emissions from production vary significantly.
As older, easily accessible sources of crude are exhausted, they
are replaced by newer sources that require more energy to
extract and refine, yielding a higher carbon intensity than
conventional crude oil. As extraction becomes more difficult,
emissions from crude oil will only increase, but [the state]
expects that fuels with carbon intensity values fifty to eighty
percent lower than gasoline will be needed to meet its emissionsreduction targets. No matter how efficiently crude oil is
extracted and refined, it cannot supply this level of reduction.
To meet California’s ambitious goals, the development and use
of alternative fuels must be encouraged.141

To provide the encouragement, the state “required regulated parties
to meet the Fuel Standard’s carbon-intensity-reduction targets by
supplying alternative fuels or buying credits from the sellers of
alternative fuels.”142
To calculate the carbon intensity score of crude oil, the state
distinguished between “existing” sources (those comprising “at least
two percent of California’s crude-oil market in 2006,” the year used to
calculate baseline values) and “emerging” sources (everything else).143
It also differentiated between “high-carbon-intensity crude oil”
(HCICO) and non-HCICO.144 Existing and emerging non-HCICO
were assigned a carbon intensity value equal to the 2006 average of
grams of CO2 equivalent produced per mega joule of energy.145
Existing HCICO were assigned a separate average value, while
emerging HCICO were required to obtain an individual measure of
carbon intensity.146
Various parties challenged the values assigned to imported
ethanol, as well as those developed for crude oil sold in the state. The
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1084–85.
142. Id. at 1085.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See id. (comparing the 2006 averages for HCICO and non-HCICO).
146. Id.
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parties alleged that the ethanol standards facially discriminated
against out-of-state ethanol and that the crude oil standards
discriminated against out-of-state crude oil in purpose and effect.147
The parties also alleged that the crude oil standards impermissibly
regulated extraterritorially.148 The Ninth Circuit rejected all of the
DCCD claims.
The court framed its inquiry as whether California’s assignment of
different carbon intensities to ethanol from different regions can be
explained by “‘some reason, apart from their origin . . . .’”149 It
concluded that California’s assignment of different values was driven
not by geography, but rather by differences in carbon intensity.150
That constituted a nondiscriminatory reason for the higher carbon
intensity value. Further, the court noted, “[t]he Fuel Standard does
not isolate California and protect its producers from competition.”151
In fact, it observed, “the lowest ethanol carbon intensity values,
providing the most beneficial market position, have been for pathways
from the Midwest and Brazil.”152 The court found nothing
discriminatory in California’s insistence that it include “emissions
from the transportation of feedstocks and fuels” in the carbon
intensity score.153 “California,” it observed, “if it is to have any chance
to curtail GHG emissions, must be able to consider all factors that
cause those emissions when it assesses alternative fuels.”154 It
concluded:
The dormant Commerce Clause does not require California to
ignore the real differences in carbon intensity among out-of-state
ethanol pathways, giving preferential treatment to those with a
higher carbon intensity. These factors are not discriminatory

147. Id. at 1086.
148. Id. For a brief explanation of the extraterritorality prong of the DCCD,
see supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. See also Denning, supra
note 19 (suggesting that DCCD extraterritoriality is largely moribund).
149. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1089 (quoting City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)).
150. See id. at 1090 (“Comparing all sources of ethanol and all factors that
contribute to the carbon intensity of an ethanol pathway, it appears
that CARB’s method of lifecycle analysis treats ethanol the same
regardless of origin, showing a nondiscriminatory reason for the unequal
results of this analysis.”).
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, § 95486(b)(1) (2007)).
153. Id. at 1091–92.
154. Id. at 1090.
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because they reflect the reality of assessing and attempting to
limit GHG emissions from ethanol production.155

The court also rejected the discriminatory purpose and effect claims
against the crude oil provisions. Though some California oil was
assigned a carbon intensity value that was much lower than its
individual carbon intensity, other California oil “suffered more from
the same arrangement than light crude from Alaska or abroad.”156
Seen in context, then, the court found no evidence of discriminatory
purpose behind the crude oil provisions; moreover, it concluded the
parties had not produced sufficient evidence of an actual
discriminatory effect sufficient to trigger heightened scrutiny.157
The Ninth Circuit also rejected arguments that the fuel standards
attempted to regulate extraterritorially by attempting to control outof-state conduct.158 “The Fuel Standard,” the court wrote, “regulates
only the California market.”159
The Fuel Standard . . . . says nothing at all about ethanol
produced, sold, and used outside California, it does not require
other jurisdictions to adopt reciprocal standards before their
ethanol can be sold in California, it makes no effort to ensure
the price of ethanol is lower in California than in other states,
and it imposes no civil or criminal penalties on non-compliant
transactions completed wholly out of state. The district court
identified several factors that might encourage ethanol
producers to adopt less carbon-intensive policies. . . . For
lifecycle analysis to be effective, it must consider all these
factors and more. But California does not control these
factors—directly or in practical effect—simply because it factors
them into the lifecycle analysis.160

While California “cannot exceed its powers” or “impose its own
regulatory standards on another jurisdiction,” it “may regulate with
reference to local harms, structuring its internal markets to set

155. Id. at 1093.
156. Id. at 1099. “We conclude that [the State’s] stated purpose was genuine.
There was no protectionist purpose, no aim to insulate California firms
from out-of-state competition.” Id. at 1100.
157. Id. The court did remand the case to the district court to assess whether
the provisions nevertheless impermissibly burdened interstate commerce
under Pike balancing. Id. at 1100–01.
158. Id. at 1106.
159. Id. at 1101.
160. Id. at 1102–03.
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incentives for firms to produce less harmful products for sale in
California.”161
Rocky Mountain Farmers Union furnishes a potential roadmap
for states wishing to successfully defend their RPS programs. First,
the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of California’s fuel standards
demonstrates the wisdom of adopting facially neutral regulations.
Doing so shifts the burden to challengers to demonstrate that RPS
provisions are discriminatory in purpose or in their effects. In
addition, the case offers some aid to states wishing to adopt
requirements that renewable energy be purchased from a particular
geographic region or that some types of energy should be excluded. As
long as states can demonstrate that the regional restrictions or the
excluded energy source were adopted for some non-protectionist
purpose (i.e., that transportation of the energy would contribute to
harms the program was trying to ameliorate), then courts will likely
be more receptive to upholding them. The Ninth Circuit’s concern
with protectionism generally is of a piece with the Supreme Court’s
own conception of the DCCD as concerned not simply with
discrimination per se, but with discrimination in the service of
protectionist aims.162
Despite the fact that the court remanded for application of Pike
balancing, it seems unlikely that a reviewing court would conclude
that the burdens on interstate commerce “clearly exceed” benefits
that might accrue to a state from the mitigation of climate change.
The prospect of defending RPS programs on this much more
hospitable ground is reason enough to design RPS programs to be as
indifferent as possible to geography and in no event as a vehicle for
protecting or enhancing parochial economic interests.

Conclusion
Given the difficulties of passing major structural legislation at the
federal level, states will likely continue to lead the way in some
environmental regulation—especially in controversial areas such as
climate change mitigation. Those that do so should appreciate the
federal constitutional doctrines that operate to constrain the states.
At the moment, only one, the DCCD, seems to loom large. RPS
programs furnish a good context in which to examine how the DCCD
can restrict state choice.
161. Id. at 1103–04. The court likewise rejected the related argument that
California’s standards exposed producers to the risk of inconsistent and
conflicting regulations. See id. at 1104–05. “If we were to invalidate
regulation every time another state considered a complementary
statute,” the court wrote, “we would destroy the states’ ability to
experiment with regulation.” Id. at 1105.
162. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
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What might be termed RPS 1.0, not unlike earlier attempts to
deal with state and municipal governments’ solid waste problems,
could run into rough sailing in court, even in the absence of a federal
RPS program preempting state efforts. Many current programs are
framed in parochial and protectionist terms that will make courts
wary of upholding them. Advocates of RPS programs recognize this;
many have urged states to strip out or revise the provisions—such as
in-state and in-region generation requirements—most vulnerable to
invalidation under the DCCD. However, that doctrine itself is in some
flux and RPS programs could furnish the impetus to alter its contours
for the future, providing states with more flexibility, provided there
are sufficient assurances that protectionism and economic self-dealing
are not the primary motives behind the legislation.
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